

POLITICAL AND LITERARY REVIEW.
July 30, 1812.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.

The accumulation of the French forces has induced Lord Wellington to raise the blockade of Badajoz, and to withdraw the British army to a position better suited to the operations of our troops. The advanced guard of the French army of Portugal, which had broken up from the Torres on the third of June, having entered Extremadura on the 18th, and as it was expected that on the 15th they would be at Merida, and form a junction with their main body in the South, Lord Wellington ordered all the allied forces to cross the Guadiana, which was effected on the 17th without any difficulty or loss. Since that period, the allied British and Portuguese army have been encamped in the woods upon the Caya, about Torre de Moura, having their right flank the Domo de Cayo, Alentejo, and several divisions, and Brigadier-General Madden's cavalry being in Campo Mayor. The troops which had been under the command of General Spencer, on the frontiers of Castile, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha in proportion as the enemy crossed that river at Almaraz; and the whole were upon the Caya, between Quinta de Saint Jean and Arconches. When Lord Wellington's last dispatch, from Arconches, Quinta de Saint Jean, on the 20th ult., was sent off, the enemy's advanced guard had appeared in the neighbourhood of Badajoz; and it was his Lordship's opinion, that their whole army would be collected on the 21st of June.

It now appears, that the plan of operations adopted by the enemy is precisely the same as that which we predicted in our last number, and would pursue. "To draw together," we said, "with our main body, and to make the most of the seat of war, the divisions of his army, as to overtake, with overpowering numbers, the force opposed to him; is the inevitable military system of this enemy." Lord Wellington's dispatch, published in Tuesday's Gazette, completely establishes the correctness of our remarks; for his Lordship mentions that,

"The enemy have collected, upon this occasion, all his forces from Castile, their whole forces from Madrid, &c. &c. & into their centre army, and all their forces from Arconches, excepting what is absolutely necessary to maintain their position before Merida; and thus held by Sebastian, in the eastern kingdoms of Andalusia. The enemy have abandoned Old and New Castile, with the exception of a small garrison in Madrid, and risked every thing in all parts of Spain, in order to collect this large army in Estremadura." But, we do not plume ourselves solely for having taken this ground as one of our own policy; we claim no credit for having formed the right and judicious opinion, of the policy of the British general. For we maintained, that the French system of war is now thoroughly understood by our generals, and that they had learnt the true mode of treating it, which consists in eluding its effects. This Lord Wellington has done effectually. He has not retired from his former position in that disorder and consternation, which we have many times witnessed on other occasions, by other generals but, instead of remaining in an open place, where the superior number of the enemy's cavalry would afford them a great advantage, his Lordship has fallen back upon a woody country, where cavalry cannot well act, and where, with an inferior force, he may hold the enemy in check until our reinforcements arrive. The wisdom of this measure is demonstrated by subsequent advice, which state, that no attempt has been made by the enemy to lodge the British army from their strong position, and that the general belief that the policy pursued by Lord Wellington, of eluding the system of the enemy, would constrain the French to retreat, more especially as the whole district now occupied by them was devastated on the retreat of the allies, and, consequently, the enemy cannot draw any supplies from it for so large an army as Soult commands.

By the pursuit of a policy entirely different from that adopted by the other powers of Europe, which have embraced the French, the British general has been able to check the progress of those arms, which were believed to be invincible by the people of the continent. The scene of operations is, indeed, changed, but the French have gained nothing, hitherto by the concentration of their forces. For Lord Wellington has not initiated the fatal policy of the German generals, who extended their lines of operation in proportion as the French concentrated theirs. On the contrary, his Lordship watches diligently the movements of his opponents, and regulates his own motions by them. Accordingly, as soon as the French army of Portugal commenced its march, for the purpose of forming a junction with the army of the south, the army under general Spencer

began its march, in order to strengthen our army in the south. Thus, the respective armies have collected their whole power, but under very different circumstances. The British army is furnished with every kind of provisions, and performs all its movements with ease and safety; whereas, the divisions of the enemy have been compelled to make rapid and fatiguing marches to reach their rendezvous, and, owing to the precautions taken by the allies, they have found it, on their arrival, the object of yielding them any support. The object of the French was to attack, confound, and overwhelm the allies, by a sudden and instantaneous attack made by superior numbers. But, as we before observed, the allies knew how to elude their policy.

And, by seizing a formidable position, which would either compel the enemy to attack them at a great risk, or to retreat, and divide his forces, for the sake of subsisting them. It was on this consideration that we suggested, in our last number, the very plan of conduct which we are happy to find since has been adopted by Lord Wellington. General Blake has been detached with 10,000 men to penetrate into Andalusia, and to create a diversion there in favour of the allies. It is not likely that Lord Wellington would send away so great a body as 10,000 men, knowing his inferiority in numbers to the enemy, unless he were confident that his remaining force would be fully adequate to the task of repelling the enemy. In the next place, we are observing, that his detachment under General Blake will occasion such alarm and distress in the French army, that it cannot long maintain its position. It must fight or retreat. For the guerrilla parties of the Spaniards will most probably, take advantage of the absence of the French corps, to visit all the districts lately occupied by them, and to revive the spirit of resistance. Besides, the French corps will be liable to be intercepted, and the destruction of all the divisions of the enemy, in the various places bordering on the Guadiana, must increase their wants and the means of supplying them. On this account, we ventured last week to recommend that General Graham should quit Cadiz, for the purpose of raising a reasonable diversion in favour of our grand army; and, that the result of such an operation would be, that the French Generals would be under the necessity of changing their present system and of reverting to the old mode of warfare. It gives us great satisfaction in stating, that the suggestion has been anticipated. A junction has before this time been effected between General Graham and Blake's, and we doubt not that their sudden appearance in Andalusia will entirely change the present aspect of affairs, and even the nature of the war. For our own part, we do not entertain the least apprehension relative to the position of our army or to the views of our general. We are confident, on his marches, as well as from his movements, that he will, if rendered but success probable, and our defeat possible only.

Nor are we at all alarmed at the description published in the French papers, of the force and equipment of their armies in Spain and Portugal. The publication of that account, produced on Saturday last a great sensation throughout the metropolis, and, as we think, without the least reason. For, though the French convert every circumstance to their own advantage, & therefore represent their own numbers in the most favourable light, while they strive to portray the allies in the very brink of despair and ruin; yet, even in their last official account, there is no fact recorded which is calculated to depress the hopes of the British public. The capture by the enemy of the important fortress of Tarragona, is, indeed a serious loss to the Spaniards, as it will enable him to have a full view of the military positions of the country but, notwithstanding the views of our cruizers, he will be able to supply his wants along the eastern coast of Spain. In every other respect, the aspect of affairs is not altered. The French are manifestly obliged to proceed with caution; which circumstance not only demonstrates their want of confidence in their own means, but it also gives us reason for concluding, that the war in the peninsula will not terminate in the subjugation of the people. Buonaparte's armies may march in and out from one end of Spain to the other; they may occupy all the military positions of the country but, to conquer it and to govern it peaceably, it will be first necessary to exterminate its whole population.

There is nothing in the French report of the state of the armies which is calculated to inspire apprehension; and, whatever might have been the spirited feelings of the public, when we were not a little increased by the ignorant statements in the newspapers, on Saturday,

* This junction, we believe, never took place. Editor Maitland Courier.

the greatest composure of mind followed on the perusal of Lord Wellington's dispatch in Tuesday's Gazette. Even Marmont's report corresponds with the British General's details, which prove how well founded are Lord Wellington's assertions of the mode of the enemy. We learn, indeed, more particulars from the French account; but the general relation is the same on both sides. Lord Wellington acquainted our government with the time and manner in which the junction of the different French corps was effected; and, from the intelligence published in the French papers, we may acquire a very satisfactory idea of the views of the enemy, and of the state of affairs in the peninsula. According to these, we find that General Rogner, with the advanced guard of the French army, arrived at Placencia on the 5th of June. The army under the command of Soult had received numerous reinforcements—12,000 men, under General D'Erlo, arrived at Merida on the 5th ult. and advanced to the command of Soult, who advanced again to Santa Marta, and occupied Almaraz with his right wing, in which position he awaited the arrival of the army of Portugal under Marmont. The junction between the armies of Marmont and Soult was effected on the 16th of June, after the former had arrived at Merida. The two armies then marched to Badajoz, the blockade of which, Lord Wellington foreseeing their object, had raised. On the 21st of the same month, Marmont's head quarters were at Badajoz.

Such is, in few words, the substance of this terrific French intelligence, which so ruffled the minds of our people. The newspaper writers spared no pains to keep up the storm, until Lord Wellington's dispatch of the 20th ult., from Quinta de Saint Joan, the position he had chosen whereon to receive the enemy, arrived and allayed it, like oil upon the surface of the troubled waters.

From this correspondence between the English and French accounts we may deduce several important inferences, which would have ruffled the minds of the people, if they had taken the trouble of examining them with attention. It is evident, from the French account, that Soult had received numerous reinforcements (this is the French expression) before he had been joined by Marmont, and yet, under these advantages, he did not venture to attack the British army. From this fact, combined with the circumstances of Lord Wellington having remained near Badajoz until within three days of the junction of the two French armies, we infer Soult was aware that, under the great advantages which we then enjoyed, the English army could not be attacked with any prospect of success. In the next place, it is observable, that Lord Wellington was not forced to raise the blockade by any demonstration on the part of the combined armies of the enemy; for though the French account be so worded as to convey an impression of the raising of the blockade, in consequence of the raising of their armies on Badajoz, yet the fact stated by Lord Wellington, of his having determined on the retreat, immediately after he was apprised of the arrival of Marmont's army in the neighbourhood of Soult's, and the still more glaring act, undertaken by the French, of the retreat of the British army having been effected, to use his Lordship's words, "without difficulty or loss of any description," prove that it was not the result of any great apprehension of the enemy's force. If, as the French allege, Lord Wellington precipitately raised the siege of Badajoz, and retreated Portugal, with all his troops at the approach of their army, "his retreat could not have been made with that order and composure mentioned by his Lordship." Lastly, we infer, from the perusal of the French account solely, that, in collecting the force which was again enabled the enemy to use on the offensive, he has been under the necessity of abandoning many of his military positions, of stripping Old and New Castile and Andalusia of troops, and of expatriating almost every British point in the country to the attacks of the Spanish armies and guerrillas, for the risk of defeating the British in a general action, which, it is clear, he cannot accomplish. Should the Spaniards avail themselves of the opportunity thus held out to them, of hanging upon the rear of the enemy, and of intercepting his convoys, cutting off his detachments, and of re-animating the spirits of the inhabitants, it is probable that this junction of the two French armies will eventually lead to their disgrace and ruin. But we fear the French generals will avoid these consequences by a timely retreat.—We do not think that they will readily re-enter Portugal, in which they have already suffered so much, especially as Lord Wellington, when retreating, is not apt to leave behind him any thing that can materially contribute to the subsistence and comfort of his pursuers.

There were our reflections after having read

the French account of the relative state of the contending armies; and we rejoice to find, from the dispatches which have been since received from Lord Wellington, that we were correct in the opinion we had formed of his Lordship's operations and ordered. The dispatches which the government received on Thursday from his Lordship, are of the most favourable complexion and encourage us to hope that the army, constancy, and fortitude, of the allies will, at length, be crowned with the success they deserve.

Nothing material had occurred since Lord Wellington's dispatches of the 20th ult. His head-quarters were still at Quinta de Saint Joan, and the enemy had made no preparation nor had evinced any disposition to engage our army in general battle. In its present advantageous position on this side of the Guadiana, Affairs of posts, and between reconnoitering parties frequently occurred. On the 21st ult. two great attacks were near each other. First, on the 21st, on the 22nd, a party of the 15th Light Dragoons, commanded by Capt. Lutens was surprised by a strong reconnoitering party of the enemy. Another party, also, consisting of some of the 24 German Hussars, suffered some loss on this occasion. The steadiness, however, of the allied cavalry arrested the advance of the French, towards Campo Mayor, and they retired without having been able to reconnoitre our position. When the last accounts were dispatched, the enemy occupied the country between Badajoz and Merida, and the extent of our collecting provisions.—The Spaniards, in the mean while, are on the alert. Don Julian Sanchez has been very actively employed in the plains of Old Castile, and he has succeeded in intercepting a very valuable convoy between Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. Joseph Buonaparte's baggage and private property have fallen into the hands of General Mina.

As the enemy has drawn away nearly all his forces from every part of Spain, in order to concentrate them on the Guadiana, their mode of communication, as well as their military stations, are exposed to the incursions of the Spaniards, who are making their appearance in every quarter, and annoying the enemy by their sudden and desultory attacks. To augment the army in the South, the enemy has been obliged to evacuate the provinces in the North of Spain. On the 20th of June, the French General Bonnet, who had been quartered at Ferrol, advanced to Astoria, arrived in Leon with his division of 3,000 men, after having abandoned that province, and on the same day, he marched in a southerly direction towards Palencia.—In consequence of the French having withdrawn the greater part of their troops from the Northern provinces, the patriotic army, under the command of General Sancesclides, has met with great success. It has recovered the possession of Leon and Astoria, in both of which towns General Sancesclides obtained a great number of volunteers, who joined his army.

While the Spaniards are arising in arms in the North, and the guerrilla parties are carrying on their terrible warfare at the very gates of Madrid, General Blake recrossed the Guadiana near Merida, and was at Castellano upon the 24th ultimo, on his march to Seville, should be successful in entering that city, his expedition will lead to very important results; for Soult draws the greater part of his supplies from Seville; and it appears, from the Lisbon Gazette of the 29th ultimo, that the forces left to protect it do not amount to more than 700 men. We confess that the reconquest of Seville by the patriots will afford us great pleasure, as that city was among the first, and certainly among the most strenuous, in asserting the cause of Spanish independence. To the movement of the French army, we therefore, we look with much impatience and hope.

Thus, after having told the most minute and scrupulous attention to all the various accounts, published both by our friends and our foes, relative to the condition of affairs in the peninsula, we can discover no reason why we should entertain any greater apprehension now for the fate of the allied armies than is usual for all sensible men to feel whenever a national army is in the field. It is to be expected that military operations will be chequered by occasional successes and misfortunes; but it is surely no trivial consideration, and no trivial cause of triumph, that by our valor, example, and exertions, the self-named invincible conquerors of the rest of the continent have been arrested in their career.

It cannot, however, be denied that the fall of Tarragona is a great and heavy affliction to the Spaniards. This event is undoubtedly to be lamented; but the circumstances attendant on its defence and loss yield us some consolation, whence with to encourage the public regret. No authentic account of the siege of Tarragona

has yet been published by the Spaniards. The little British expedition, under the command of Col Skerrett, which we mentioned in the preceding number, to have been detached for the relief of Tarragona, will arrive too late to render any assistance to the courageous garrison. But, it is consoling to hear from the lips of the enemy who are besieging the fortress, that he had lost, during the siege of the lower town and its out works, no less than two thousand men; a confusion so unusual and so fatal, that we conceive it will be no with the French, that we conceive it will be no exaggeration to estimate their real loss, taking as a criterion the former mode of computing losses, at seven or eight thousand men. For, if we consider the length of the siege, the ob- servation of the French general, the description given by the French general of the numerous difficulties which his troops had to encounter, under a destructive fire from the Spaniards, our calculation of the loss sustained by the enemy will not appear over-rated. The siege lasted three months, during which the French made five months' assaults; and the resolution of the gallant defenders of Tarragona, increased in proportion as the attack increased.

On the 21st of June, the French carried the lower town by storm, and from their own account of the resistance which they experienced their sacrifices must have been enormous. Suchet, the general of the besiegers unwilling to let it be supposed that the English could in any manner make themselves useful to their allies, states, in his letter to Marshal Berthier, a circumstance which proves that the French must have entered materially from the co-operation of the British vessels in the offing with the garrison. "All their vessels and frigates," Suchet writes, "set sail to run down the coast rapidly from the heights of Fort Francolet to beyond the point, and, passing by turns before our flank, they poured upon us all their batteries, with a real shower of shells, which scarcely did harm to any one." We cannot believe that the effects of such a fire, here described as a real shower of balls, should have done no mischief to the enemy. What had become of all his troops during this enfilading shower? The trenches must have been manned, and the camps must have been protected by troops. If, then, they were inundated with balls, multitudes of French must have fallen victims of the British thunder.

In short, the nature of the defence and of the loss of the French may be conceived from the concluding part of general Suchet's letter, in which he speaks of the "general massacre of the inhabitants of Tarragona with complacency. 'I fear much,' he says, 'if the garrison wait for the assault in their last hold, I shall be forced to set a terrible example, and intimidate for ever Catalonia and Spain, by the destruction of a whole city.'" This menace, the publication of which had better have been suppressed, even though he had meant to have executed it, Suchet was enabled to carry into effect on the 28th of June, when the fifth and last assault was successfully made on the remaining fortification of the place. This assault over-ruled, to use the language of Suchet, a horrible massacre; "the terrible example which I foresaw with regret in my last report has taken place, and for a long time will be recollected in Spain. Four thousand men have been killed in the city; from 10 to 12,000 men endeavoured to make their escape over the walls into the country; 1000 have been sabred or drowned; nearly 10,000, 500 of whom are officers, have been made prisoners, and are setting off for France; nearly 1000 wounded are in the hospitals of the city, where their lives were respected in the midst of the carnage. Three field marshals and the governor are among the prisoners; many others among the slain. Twenty stand of colours, thirty-eight pieces of artillery mounted, 40,000 balls and shells, 500 weight of powder and lead are in our possession."

These are striking details, and, though the pages of history record many instances of pro- nounced carnage in the storming of towns, the precedents are rare of such a deliberate cold-blooded and calculated massacre as this. It will reflect, no honour on General Suchet's

name, although his master has conferred upon him the rank of marshal, as a memorial of his bloody execution; and, perhaps, Suchet will find, to his cost, that the Catalonians are not to be intimidated by the destruction of a whole city, or by such a terrible example as he has given to them. From his own dispatch we learn that nearly 13,000 of the finest troops in Spain occupied, during the butchery, into another country. This is an army, which, having witnessed the horrors perpetrated in Tarragona, will, in re- venge, perpetrate them to their fellow-citizens, burn with the desire of retaliating upon the enemy the cruelties he has inflicted upon that unhappy town. In a little time the French general will acknowledge that he has taken a wrong mo- tion of retreating Catalonia, and of reconquering the population to the government of the usurper. The length and obliquity of the inveterate rancour is an awful argument against the French and hatred of the Spaniards resolution to maintain the independence of their country.

We have endeavoured thus to comprise, within a small compass as possible, every circum- stance which has occurred in the peninsula since the commencement of the accounts which were registered in our last number. Our digest of these events has not been complete on rumours, but on public and authentic documents, on the official dispatches of the British general, collated with the official narratives of the French generals. After a most attentive re- view of the positions, views, condition, and operations of the armies, we do not hesitate to repeat our assertion that the affairs of the pen- insula are by no means in an unpromising state; and, that the enemy has been disappointed and thwarted in the great object which he hoped to accomplish, when he directed all his forces to be assembled for the attack of the allied army. In this sentiment we feel more confirmed since our perusal of the intercepted letter from Soult to Marmont, and of the official letters of Marmont to Berthier. In the intercepted letter, which is dated Llerena; June 5, Soult observes, after having expressed the importance and necessity of their junction, "Now we have no time to lose, without exposing ourselves to serious consequences; we shall thus prevent the reinforcements the enemy expects, and Badajoz will be saved." These serious consequences which Soult apprehends from delay are likely to occur, for the position taken up by Lord Wellington is so strong by nature, that he cannot safely be attacked by the enemy; and thus, while he is able to procrastinate, or to avoid, a general action, his reinforcements will have arrived, and Soult will be effectually deterred from realising his plan. Marmont, too, expresses his mortification at the retreat of Lord Wellington: "It is vexatious," he writes, "that he did not dare to await us, for a signal vic- tory would have infallibly marked our arrival in these regions." When we hear experienced offi- cers boast in this manner, we may be allowed to ask, since a signal victory was so certain, why Marmont has not attacked Lord Well- ington in his second position.

There is a contradiction between the accounts published by the French government and the letter of General Marmont, which sufficiently explains the cause why he did not subsequent- ly attack Lord Wellington, on his present ground. The government affirms, with a view of taking credit to itself, for its providence, that "quantities of provisions and stores had, for some time, arrived at the important point of Almaraz," for the use of the army, which was on its march to effect a junction with Soult. Marmont, on the contrary, in order to gain some merit for himself, in his letter to Berthier, dated June 21, from Badajoz, praises "the excellent spirit which animated the army dur- ing a long and painful march, under a burning sun and amidst meat-privations." It is proba- bly owing to these privations, that the French Ge- nerals have not yet risked a battle with our troops. If they had good reason for wishing to bring us to a general action, we may congratulate the public that their efforts have been failed by Lord Wellington; and that the delay hourly augments their difficulties, while it adds to our strength, and to that of our allies. The only circumstance, therefore, of which the French can boast, is, their retention of Bada-

joz. That town was vigorously attacked by the allies, and as vigorously defended by the Gov- ernor, General Philippon. But when Marmont, Soult endeavours, in his letter of the 21st ult., to Berthier, and in his general orders, to per- suade the world that the raising of the siege of Badajoz "ascertain the victory which the army of the South gained on the banks of the Al- mura on the 16th of May, over the Anglo-Portu- guese and Spanish Army," his inference is as inconclusive as his assertion is false, that we have lost in the siege 8000 British, and between 8 and 9000 Spanish and Portuguese troops?

The relative force of the armies is thus esti- mated. Lord Wellington, after having detached Gen. Blake, had about 13,000 fewer troops than the enemy. He has 45,000, the French about 58,000, viz. 30,000 under Soult, collected from Murcia, Grenada, and the surrounding pro- vinces, and 2,000 from Cadix; 24,000 with Marmont, from Ciudad Rodrigo, including the greater part of the garrison of that fortress, and 2000 from Madrid. Lord Wellington has, as we have already said, 45,000 men; but com- prehending the reinforcements expected from Ireland and England, and the troops actually on the road to Portugal and Alentejo, he calcu- lates on an addition of 15,000 men, composing in the whole 55,000 British, Portuguese, and the Spanish detachment, under Castanos. There are not more than 2,500 sick in the allied ar- my. The country, which has been left, has been entirely desolated, & the corn-fields have either been reaped or the produce destroyed. Our provisions and stores have been removed from Coimbra towards Lisbon, to be conveyed thence by water to Abranches, and subsequently by land-carriage to Portugal.

SIXTH Calcutta Lottery.

SEVENTH DAY'S DRAWING, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 29, 1812.

No. 5591, a Prize of 1,000 Sicca Rupees.
PRIZES OF 100 RUPEES EACH.
37 46 83 175 236 301 410 483
409 653 692 700 846 889 910 914
923 927 957 1007 1110 1139 1259 1287
1293 1305 1403 1424 1546 1609 1692 1909
2046 2092 2095 2137 2181 2186 2207 2219
2242 2282 2330 2380 2384 2374 2363 2371
2585 2790 2793 2893 2867 2943 2987 3144
3175 3177 3201 3250 3319 3318 3330 3350
3451 3456 3461 3600 3711 3758 3789 3829
3968 3992 3940 3947 3957 4133 4158 4411
4203 4278 4324 4301 4373 4577 4418 4431
4458 4468 4502 4551 4669 4743 5012 5117
4578 4591 4922 4933 4969 5013 5102 5117
5158 5217 5315 5348 5357 5316 5637 5646
5692 5798 5811 5855 5993 5997 4175 4198.

D L A N K S.
9 95 47 52 65 67 89 100
110 121 154 185 163 190 232 243
247 282 353 371 387 392 407 464
479 486 501 512 544 545 546 576
580 607 630 675 701 704 734 747
754 778 795 796 797 798 801 820
837 830 886 867 869 881 893 913
945 955 964 975 1024 1085 1097 1092
1109 1112 1116 1145 1150 1153 1157 1169
1170 1172 1185 1186 1195 1196 1219 1215
1238 1260 1264 1285 1297 1326 1345 1383
1365 1398 1401 1411 1415 1419 1437 1443
1454 1471 1481 1489 1492 1500 1506 1519
1553 1564 1565 1568 1611 1616 1635 1679
1739 1738 1773 1812 1818 1821 1849 1859
1854 1870 1877 1884 1901 1922 1933 1948
1948 1968 1974 2000 2003 2128 2138 2190
2175 2188 2211 2299 2243 2445 2265 2270
2331 2339 2339 2391 2411 2417 2427 2428
2472 2474 2489 2490 2509 2519 2522 2529
2569 2560 2573 2593 2596 2636 2639 2640
2747 2765 2772 2795 2810 2828 2830 2854
2895 2919 2938 2944 2953 2959 2964 2969
3004 3024 3032 3040 3089 3060 3072 3079
3141 3143 3156 3169 3181 3176 3204 3218
3218 3280 3254 3275 3280 3285 3306 3318
3350 3344 3374 3377 3415 3418 3484 3518

3599 3561 3581 3516 3535 3537 3639 3649
3657 3674 3675 3677 3698 3721 3727 3735
3743 3764 3770 3788 3810 3815 3850 3892
3875 3904 3910 3928 3977 3980 4007 4010
4029 4038 4050 4072 4083 4107 4109 4119
4140 4163 4 476 4182 4186 4199 4209 4219
4217 4221 4234 4303 4334 4343 4351 4375
4372 4391 4400 4413 4429 4460 4469 4504
4530 4532 4563 4607 4609 4610 4652 4657
4691 4711 4732 4735 4729 4737 4749 4824
4837 4857 4895 4906 4921 4939 4948 4992
4971 4998 5000 5010 5014 5026 5040 5049
5083 5139 5130 5131 5135 5199 5200 5217
5266 5273 5291 5293 5304 5309 5351 5364
5425 5439 5492 5495 5496 5477 5494 5502
5508 5510 5523 5529 5543 5554 5560 5574
5578 5583 5628 5669 5688 5698 5690 5696
5708 5714 5734 5739 5754 5758 5780 5801
5824 5836 5849 5856 5863 5866 5885 5892
5905 5911 5944 5948 5957 5969 5974 5975
5980 5990

EIGHTH DAY'S DRAWING, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1812.

No. 1893 a Prize of 10,000 Sicca Rupees.
No. 1394 5511 Prizes of 5,000 Sicca Rupees

No. 1438 a Prize of 1,000 Sicca Rupees.
PRIZES OF 100 RUPEES EACH.

50 56 78 81 113 212 321 409
425 443 500 532 521 536 588 876
1020 1074 1084 1175 1213 1297 1344 1430
1469 1511 1595 1604 1707 1706 1900 1965
2070 2084 2085 2096 2105 2180 2191 2362
2381 2392 2406 2416 2496 2574 2594 2612
2735 2796 2818 2859 2945 2985 3018 3061
3168 3182 3192 3187 3203 3270 3314 3383
3400 3441 3429 3440 3453 3531 3510 3640
3780 3766 3768 3829 3948 3938 3967 3982
3914 3946 3953 4040 4063 4143 4 439 5373
4419 4435 4397 4452 4457 4489 4516 4574
4578 4589 4600 4694 4656 4660 4692 4731
4767 4811 4912 4833 4879 5001 5018 5143
5301 5310 5344 5316 5318 5391 5115 5559
5692 5638 5724 5790 5923 5893.

B L A N K S.
11 17 63 63 115 216 127 130
159 191 187 903 255 359 594
845 907 352 408 415 439 453 480
484 495 511 534 538 567 572 581
638 699 634 660 661 674 702 736
738 743 768 790 7 81 839 808 909
911 940 902 973 977 998 1005 1009
1030 1057 1071 1105 1115 1117 1135 1146
1163 1178 1179 1180 1194 1216 1220 1249
1252 1308 1336 1341 1357 1359 1366 1376
1384 1388 1389 1393 1441 1417 1459 1461
1467 1472 1522 1520 1535 1538 1551 1562
1566 1571 1598 1600 1611 1616 1636 1638
1667 1658 1661 1675 1677 1705 1709 1720
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